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Abstract
Climate change has become one of the biggest issue across the globe as 
most countries have been bearing the consequences of this phenomenon 
on a global scale. Countries have been drafting environmental regulations 
to help mitigate the environmental pollution caused by climate change. 
Therefore, the implications of environmental policies in various sectors 
of the economy are dependent on state regulations. The main objective 
of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance on 
environmental performance. Furthermore, this study examines the impact 
of institutional regulations on the relationship of corporate governance and 
firms’ environmental performance. The data was collected from the top 120 
manufacturing companies that are based in Pakistan, India, China and 
Bangladesh. The binary logit regression methodology was employed in this 
study. The results indicate that the attributes of corporate governance have a 
positive and significant impact on green performance. In addition, the results 
were also positive and significant on the moderating role of institutional 
regulation for corporate governance and firm performance. Hence, based 
on the empirical findings, this study recommends strict environmental 
institutional regulations to further enhance environmental performance.
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Introduction
Environmental protection has been a key agenda in many countries 
around the world to mitigate the effects of climate change. These long 
- term fluctuations in climate are due to mass pollution, emissions of 
carbon dioxide and harmful gasses, and other direct or indirect human 
activities. Human beings have been destroying the environment 
while fulfilling their basic needs. Hence, to reduce the effects of 
climate change, countries have designed and implemented several 
eco-friendly policies, such as the Kyoto Protocol, carbon taxes, Paris 
Agreement and schemes of emission trading. Tricker (2009) stated 
that the changes in institutional policies have reshaped the landscape 
for business competition and included these environmental issues in 
the strategic goals of corporations. Ortiz-de-Mandojana, Aguilera-
Caracuel and Aragón-Correa (2010) suggested that bold and creative 
reforms in governing bodies, and corporate governance structures 
and practices are needed to meet current environmental challenges.
The role of corporate governance in an organization is well discussed 
and globally accepted. Generally, the literature on corporate 
governance were centered on various control, monitoring and 
principal-agent problems. However, the implications of corporate 
governance on environmental policies have not been completely 
elucidated (Berrone & Gómez-Mejia, 2009). A recent study suggested 
that corporate governance does have a significant influence on the 
adoption of active environmental policies (Walls, Berrone & Phan, 2012; 
Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2010). According to Berrone and Gómez-
Mejia (2009), eco-friendly corporate governance strategies must be 
geared towards the environment and allocate any environmental 
related issues to a specific committee. Moreover, various literature 
have supported this notion that corporate governance structure and 
strategies have positively influenced environmental related decisions 
(Dixon-Fowler, Ellstrand & Johnson, 2017; Berrone & Gómez-Mejía, 
2009; Huang, Lobo & Zhoul, 2009).
The need for eco-friendly corporate strategies have become crucial 
in tackling the challenges of environmental pollution. However, 
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evidences were brought forth that have shown big businesses 
frequently violating the environmental protection laws (Jang, Park, 
Roh & Han, 2015). Such actions from these organizations have led 
to various problems such as the emission of harmful gasses, large 
financial cost, labor injuries, disabilities, illness, and even death. 
These factors have not only affected the employees, but have also 
been carried forward to the customers. Most organizations tend to 
make decisions, particularly with regards to industrial waste product, 
with less consideration of the environment.
Corporate governance play a major role in the decision making process 
of any organization, which can be observed through the organizations’ 
financial performance and social behavior. Unfortunately, there are 
very limited grounding theories of corporate governance, especially 
with respect to the effects of corporate governance on environmental 
performance. In the absence of a definitive theory, (Walls et al., 
2012) employed a fact-based research methodology to explore the 
relationship between corporate governance and environmental 
performance. It was identified that a large number of organizations 
have performed with lesser or greater environmental friendly 
behaviors when compared to the requirements of the governing 
mechanism. Hence, this suggests that the degree of variation and 
the motives for corporate behavior are broader than expected. 
Certain existing regulatory strategies that are focused on compliance 
have failed to facilitate reward or encourage beyond compliance 
behavior (Amore & Bennedsen, 2016). Moreover, the compliance of 
environmental policies are affected by the institutional regulations in 
a country as the compliance of corporate governance on eco-friendly 
policies are insufficient.
Additionally, a recent study have tested the moderating role of 
institutional regulations on the relationship between corporate 
governance and environmental performance (Ortiz-de-Mandojana, 
Aguilera-Caracuel & Morales-Raya, 2016). However, this study was 
limited to developed countries, and the data employed in this study 
was more than a decade old. The regulations for corporate governance 
on the environment are constantly changing. Consequently, the 
decades old statistics are not appropriate to conclude that institutional 
regulations have affected the environmental performance specifically 
in developing countries. Moreover, researchers have been using 
different moderator variables to identify the changes in relationship 
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between the independent and dependent variables (Nouri, Sanayei, 
Fathi, Kazemi & Soltani, 2016). Hence, this study investigates 
the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
environmental performance. Furthermore, this study examines 
the moderating role of institutional regulations between corporate 
governance and corporate environmental performance. Data was 
collected from the top 120 manufacturing companies from four Asian 
countries, which are Pakistan, China, Bangladesh and India. This 
study applied Binary Logit Model to test the proposed model.
The structure of the remaining paper is divided into five sections. 
In section two, literature is discussed based on the hypotheses 
constructed. Section three outlines the method of data collection and 
measurement of the variables. Section four presents the statistical 
findings. Section five presents a discussion on the results. Finally, 
section six concludes the limitations and provide suggestions on 
future research.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Corporate Governance
With regards to corporate governance and its influence on 
environmental safety, the core element of corporate governance is the 
directors that play an active role in all decision-making processes  in 
organizations. For instance, directors are part of the corporate board 
that have the power to decide on operational and strategic agendas of 
the firm. Every decision made on strategies and operations, including 
those that involve environmental issues, would pass through 
the corporate board (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Therefore, as the 
central decision-making authority, corporate boards are responsible 
for environmental strategies for the firm, and subsequently these 
strategies must be proactively enforced (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et 
al., 2016). Due to high regulatory pressure, it has become common 
practice in organizations to have a separate committee that deals 
with environmental issues (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2017; Babiak & 
Trendafilova, 2011). These committees are also known as corporate 
social responsibility committee. Moreover, diversity (with regards to 
independent directors, foreign directors or others) within the corporate 
board is an asset to organizations, whereby these individuals will be 
able to develop and enforce efficient environmental policies (Villiers, 
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Naiker & van Staden, 2011). The role of the board of directors are 
extremely relevant in tackling environmental concerns. (Villiers 
et al., 2011) proposed that a less diverse, large, and independent 
board of directors would restrict the environmental performance 
of the organization. The complexities of a large and independent 
board weakens their ability of effective monitoring and information 
processing, however, these hurdles can be minimized by focusing on 
a small and diverse board.
In addition, Tauringana and Chithambo (2015) suggested that board 
size is associated with the diverse knowledge from each board 
members, and further implied that board size significantly influences 
the dispersion of environmental information in firms. The extent and 
depth of boardroom discussions on environmental issues determine 
the quality of environmental strategies and policies within the firm. 
The quality of environmental policies are also affected by the presence 
of foreign directors, as directors from another country would exhibit 
different management skills and knowledge of environmental 
policies from various other countries (Aguilera-Caracuel & Ortiz-
de Mandojana, 2013). Foreign directors could play an important 
part in the preparation of new environmental policies which have 
already been implemented in other countries within the firm. The 
probability of lawsuits due to violation of environment policies is 
essentially dependent on the attitude of the corporate board towards 
the environment (Aguilera-Caracuel & Ortiz-de Mandojana, 2013). 
Hence, to identify the determinants of environmental litigation, this 
study focuses on the corporate board as the core decision making unit 
within firms that are involved in shaping corporate environmental 
policies. This study used three important proxy variables of corporate 
governance that are closely linked with the environmental strategies 
implication. As such, the following hypothesis is presented:
Hypothesis 1a: Delegating the environmental responsibilities to an 
environmental committee will positively influence the environmental 
performance.
Hypothesis 1b: Highly independent board will positively influence 
the environmental performance.
Hypothesis 1c: More diverse board, in terms of nationality, will 
positively influence the environmental performance.
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Institutional Regulations
According to the “quiet life” argument proposed by Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2003), when executives are not exposed to the 
disciplining role of takeovers, they will tend to extract personal rent 
by undertaking fewer initiatives that require major managerial effort 
and organizational changes. This statement bridges the gap between 
green innovation and corporate governance as the current process of 
research and development within organizations have significantly 
changed and has demanded changes within the organizational 
structure. The requirements of the “going green” phenomenon 
is complex and demands highly innovative and unique methods 
that are only possible with a current and knowledgeable research 
and development department (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2016). 
Moreover, Koc Santalò and Diestre (2012) argued that, “successfully 
reducing and preventing waste emissions necessitates a great deal of 
extra managerial effort because it requires a complex redesign of a 
firm’s internal processes and the development of green competencies”. 
Similarly, the OECD reported that, “the most important factor 
in preventing firms from taking a more radical approach to eco-
innovation and aiming for systemic shifts would be that even more 
progressive businesses remain unconsciously aligned to and locked 
into conventional business models. Many companies are comfortable 
with their existing business models and not ready to leverage the 
crucial systemic changes that are needed for radical innovation”.
The effectiveness of the corporate governance structure towards the 
adoption of proactive environmental friendly policies and behavior 
are significantly dependent on the national institutional context. In this 
regard, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) have stated that the institutions 
hold high importance to corporate governance. Consequently, past 
literature have indicated that the social responsibility behavior 
of organizations are closely linked to the institutional pressure for 
environmental stability (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2013; Berrone, 
Fosfuri, Gelabert & Gomez-Mejia, 2013). The authors have concluded 
that the firms’ tendency to be involved in environmental innovations 
are high when regulatory pressure from the institutions are high.
Furthermore, the study carried out by (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 
2010) suggested that environmental regulations at the national level 
persuaded firms to initiate eco-friendly programs. Additionally, the 
study conducted by (Sullivan, 2009) investigated the effects of the 
influence from national regulations on the reduction of greenhouse 
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gas emission. Delmas (2002) stated that the implications of the ISO 
14001 standards had varied across borders as it was dependent 
on the national environmental policies. Specifically, in the case of 
multinational companies, these companies would be located and 
operate in various countries, where each unit’s environmental policies 
would need to adapt according to the host country’s regulations 
(Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2013). Consequently, different units of the 
same multinational organization would enjoy cost benefits of low 
environmental protection in the countries for which the established 
environmental protection policies are weak. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis are stated as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The probability of good environmental performance is 
dependent on the institutional regulations of the country where the 
firm is operating.
Hypothesis 3a: Institutional regulations can significantly moderate 
the relationship between the environmental committee and 
environmental performance.
Hypothesis 3b: Institutional regulations can significantly moderate 
the relationship between independent directors and environmental 
performance.
Hypothesis 3c: Institutional regulations can significantly moderate 
the relationship between foreign directors and environmental 
performance.
Conceptual Framework
The literature have concluded that the decision making authority is 
an inherited element of corporate governance which is performed by 
the corporate board. From the literature review, the most prominent 
concept of corporate governance is the agency theory (Ross, 1973), 
however, this theory is limited and does not justify the importance 
of environmental issues for strategic goals. The main assumption 
behind agency theory revolves around the problems faced by the 
agency, for which most of the organizations face due to the separation 
of ownership and management (Ross, 1973). Other organizational 
paradigms for corporate governance and firm performance are based 
on the primacy of shareholders. The various theories on corporate 
governance, such as agency theory and stewardship theory have 
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highlighted the issues of performance, particularly the performance 
of top management and their interest. There have not been any 
provision on the environmental performance and social performance 
of the organizations in these theories (Walls et al., 2012). However, 
the main assumptions of the  institutional theory are related to the 
current study. Therefore, this study incorporates institutional theory 
(Scott, 1987) as organizations are required to operate and interact 
with the external factors such as governments, society and different 
cultures. The integration of external factors develop and reshape 
the organizational structure and practices. Hence, the institutional 
policies of a country does have a significant effect on the adoption 
of environmental practices and social behavior of organizations. 
However, there are limited studies conducted that considered the 
role of institutional regulations on environmental performance (Walls 
et al., 2012). For instance, if strict environmental regulations were 
drafted and enforced in a country, corporate governance structure of 
the organization will induce corporate social responsibility within the 
organizations by establishing committees that will oversee corporate 
environmental policies. Consequently, if environmental policies are 
flexible in a country, the corporate board will find ways or loopholes 
to avoid the enforcement of such policies in order to save cost. Hence, 
with regards to the fact based arguments of Walls et al. (2012), this 
study proposed that the institutional regulations moderate the 
relationship between corporate governance and environmental 
performance.
Figure 1. Research framework
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Methodology
The data collected for this study were companies of the manufacturing 
sector that are selected from four Asian countries (i.e. Pakistan, India, 
China and Bangladesh), as these countries are currently at the same 
stage in the implementation of environmental regulations (Jang et al., 
2015). Moreover, the corporate structure and governance mechanism 
of the sample selected countries are similar, and therefore reduces the 
chance for data heterogeneity and potential outliers. The data from 
the top 120 manufacturing companies were collected from the selected 
countries (30 top companies from each country) for the year 2017. 
Market capitalization was used as a measure to determine the top 
companies from each country. The manufacturing sector was selected 
for empirical analysis as this sector has been a key component of the 
economy in all selected countries.
Measurement of Variables and Collection of Data
The dependent variable for this study is the environmental performance 
of the organizations and is measured through dichotomous variable, 
as suggested in the study by (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2016). The 
variable is assigned a value of 1 if the firm is involved in producing 
green products in the year 2017, or it will be assigned the value of 0 if 
the firm does not produce any green products. 
On the other hand, the independent variable is corporate governance 
and is measured through three proxy variables. These variables 
are chosen due to their potential influence on environmental 
performance and is subjected to the availability of data as only a 
few firms have provided detailed information on their corporate 
governance structure and financial disclosure. The first proxy is  the 
environmental committee or corporate social responsibility committee 
and is assigned the value of 1 if it is present in an organization, 
otherwise it is assigned a value of 0. A second proxy variable is the 
number of independent directors which is measured as the percentage 
of outside directors to board size. Data related to this variable are 
extracted from annual reports from the selected companies. The third 
proxy of corporate governance used in this study is the existence 
of international directors on the board of directors. This variable is 
measured as the proportion of international directors on the board to 
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board size. Information on this variable was obtained from the annual 
reports of the firms. 
Institutional regulations for environmental protection are measured 
as the score for ecosystem vitality of the country. Ecosystem vitality 
is a measure deduced from the effects of industrialization and 
urbanization and is recorded in the Environmental Performance Index 
2017. Ecosystem vitality includes several indicators (Water Resources, 
Agriculture, Forests, Fisheries, Biodiversity & Habitat, Climate & 
Energy) that determines the state of the environment. This study 
defines institutional regulations as an independent and moderator 
variable between corporate governance and green performance. 
Furthermore, this study employs three control variables, namely firm 
size, firm financial performance and leverage in empirical analysis. 
Firm size is measured as the log of total assets of organization and 
accurate measurements were obtained from the year-end value of the 
assets. The data related to assets are collected from the balance sheet 
of the respective firms.
Profitability of the organization can affect its behavior towards the 
adoption of environmental policy. Therefore, the profitability of the 
organization is a control variable employed in this study. Profitability 
is measure of the return on an assets, which has been frequently cited 
in literature as an indicator of a company’s financial performance. 
This study also controls the firm’s leverage which is obtained by 
dividing total liabilities to total assets. Firm’s leverage can limit the 
firms’ intention to make eco-friendly investment decisions, as firms 
may use the additional funds to fulfill their debts.
Econometrics Model
The econometrics model of the study is as follows;
Model 1
Model 2
α β1 β2 β3 μ
Environmental Perforance
=  α +  β1Envcom +  β2Inddir + β3Fordir + β4Envcom ∗ Instreg + β5Inddir∗ Instreg + β6Fordir ∗ Instreg + μ 
 
Environmental Perforance =  α +  β1Envcom +  β2Inddir + β3Fordir + μ 
 
α β1 β2 β3 β4 ∗ β5∗ β6 ∗ μ
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Results and Discussion
To eliminate potential outliers from the data, this study applied 
a data trimming technique proposed by Cox (2013). Trimming is a 
method used to reduce highly scattered values from the data. After 
data trimming, descriptive statistics of the data was carried out. The 
results of the descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 
Data Characteristics
Countries Ind_dir For_dir Number of 
Companies having 
Environment 
committee
Score of 
EPI
Mean Mean
Pakistan 3 3 19 14
China 3 2 27 2
Bangladesh 2 2 26 23
India 3 3 21 20
Note: Env_com: Environment Committee, Ind_dir: Independent Director, For_dir: 
Foreign Directors, EPI: Environment Performance Index
The results show that the average number of independent directors 
on the corporate board is 2 to 3 members in 2017. The number of 
foreign directors on the corporate board for selected companies 
are 2 to 3 members in the sample countries. The environmental 
committee is measured as the dichotomous variable and therefore, 
the mean value is not examined. The number of companies with an 
environmental committee from the sample countries are presented in 
Table 1. China has the majority number of environmental committees 
which are present in 27 companies. However, the EPI score for China 
is the lowest as compare to other countries which indicates that the 
environmental regulations in China are insufficient despite their hard 
efforts to attain environmental sustainability. 
This study applied a binary logit model to test the proposed hypotheses. 
Binary logit model is considered as the most appropriate technique to 
be utilized when the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, 
where its value lies between 0 and 1. Table 2 presents the correlation 
between the variables. 
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix
Env_com Ind_dir For_dir Inst_reg Firm_size Profi Lever
Env_com 1
Ind_dir 0.546*** 1
For_dir 0.328** 0.314*** 1
Inst_reg 0.157* 0.102* 0.133* 1
Firm_size 0.250** 0.041 0.265** 0.112* 1
Profi 0.528*** 0.183* 0.420*** 0.517*** 0.614*** 1
Lever -0.200** 0.302** -0.192** -0.069 0.221** -0.335** 1
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%
Note: Env_com: Environment Committee, Ind_dir: Independent Director, For_dir: 
Foreign Directors, Inst_reg: Institutional Regulations, Firm_size: Firm Size, Profi: 
Profitability, Lever: Leverage
The results for the binary logit regression are shown in Table 3. By 
utilizing the econometrics model, two models were designed and 
examined in this study. Model 1 includes the independent and control 
variables, while Model 2 was develop to identify the relationship 
between the variables. The results of Model 1 indicate that the 
environmental committee, independent directors, foreign directors 
and institutional regulations have a positive and significant influence 
on green performance. The results between the control variables 
show that profitability has a positive and significant effect on green 
performance, however, leverage has a negative but significant impact 
on green performance. Furthermore, the results from Model 1 suggest 
that the probability for green performance is high with the existence of 
an environmental committee as the relationship between these factors 
are significant at the 1% level of significance, with an Odd ratio of 
1.065. Based on these results, hypothesis 1a is accepted. Moreover, 
these results are in line with those from previous studies (Ortiz-de-
Mandojana et al., 2016; Walls et al., 2012) as scholars have claimed 
that delegating environment responsibilities to a specific committee 
increases the environmental performance of the firms. Consequently, 
environmental committees are only responsible for policies that 
involve environmental issues and therefore, it is crucial for executives 
to communicate effectively on issues regarding environmental 
friendly policies. By doing so, the environmental committee would 
be able to positively affect the environmental performance (Walls et 
al., 2012)
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Table 3
Binary Logit Regression
Odd Ratio Model 1 Odd Ratio Model 2
Env_com 1.065* 1.157*
Ind_dir 1.104** 1.007**
For_dir 1.087* 1.259*
Inst_reg 1.509* 1.155*
Firm_size 1.297* 1.195*
Profi 1.138* 1.248*
Lever 0.328 0.886*
Env_com* Inst_reg 1.015*
Ind_dir* Inst_reg 1.221*
For_dir* Inst_reg 1.302*
Intercept 223.026 219.917
-2 Log likelihood 437.225 573.151
Cox & Snell R Square 0.305 0.385
Nagelkerke R Square 0.386 0.461
Chi-square 221.724 253.227
*** significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 1%
Note: Env_com: Environment Committee, Ind_dir: Independent Director, For_dir: 
Foreign Directors, Inst_reg: Institutional Regulations, Firm_size: Firm Size, Profi: 
Profitability, Lever: Leverage
To answer hypothesis 1b, the results of the binary regression analysis 
indicates that the relationship between independent directors and 
green performance is positive and statistically significant at 5% level 
of significance. The Odd ratio of independent directors is 1.104, 
which implies that a minor change in the percentage of independent 
directors would lead to a higher green performance probability. 
The results are in line with the findings from Ortiz-de-Mandojana 
et al. (2016), Walls et al. (2012), as a positive relationship between 
independent directors and environmental performance was observed 
in these studies. In addition to the similarities of these findings, the 
authors from previous studies concluded that independent directors 
do not have the required knowledge on the firms’ internal structure 
which subsequently worsens environmental performance. However, 
Slawinski (2012) argued that the independent directors monitor 
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the board’s performance, but are much more concerned with the 
expectations from stakeholders. Therefore, independent directors can 
positively influence the environmental performance of organizations. 
Another possible reason for this positive relationship is that the 
selected countries are developing countries, and that most of the 
independent directors are from developed countries. These directors 
would eventually bring in more environmental friendly agendas 
to the board and encourage the board to adopt more eco-friendly 
policies.
Similarly, the relationship between foreign directors and firms’ green 
performance is positive and statistically significant at 1% significance 
level (Odd ratio is 1.087). Hence, hypothesis 1c is accepted, and 
concludes that the probability for eco-friendly products is higher 
under the management of foreign directors. The direct relationship 
between institutional regulations and green performance is positive 
and significant at 1% level of significance, with Odd ration valued at 
1.509. Thus, hypothesis 2 is accepted, and asserts that the probability 
for green performance is high in countries where the institutional 
regulation on the environment are strict. The relationship between 
foreign directors and environmental performance is rarely 
investigated in previous studies. However, due to the large number 
of foreign direct investments in  developing countries, the percentage 
of directors from foreign countries have increased significantly. The 
empirical results indicate that foreign directors are an important part 
of the organization as they are able to contribute positively towards 
environmental performance. Moreover, foreign directors are more 
concerned about their presence and reputation, in the international 
context. Hence, they are able to provide more eco-friendly ideas that 
may have been implemented by other companies in their own country. 
Foreign directors from different countries bring a variety of unique 
ideas to cope with environmental issues. Other than that, the direct 
relationship between institutional regulations and environmental 
performance is positive and significant, with Odd ratio at 1.509 which 
also implies that strict environmental policies that are established in 
countries will affect the social behavior within the organization.
The results of Model 2 indicates that the hypothesis 3a, 3b and 3c 
is positive and significant at 1% level of significance, with Odd 
ratios at 1.015, 1.221 and 1.302 respectively. These findings assert 
that institutional regulations moderate the relationship of the 
environmental committee, independent directors and foreign 
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directors with the firms’ green performance. Additionally, these 
results suggest that in the presence of stringent environmental 
regulations in a country, the environmental committee works harder 
and effectively to avoid law suits (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2016). 
Moreover, independent directors have gained more information on 
environmental regulations as they have been involved in more than 
one corporate boards, which enables them to put forth unique ideas 
to tackle environmental issues. With regards to foreign directors, they 
are more patriotic towards their own country, and while having to 
manage their large share of ownership may prompt foreign directors 
to avoid risks when pursuing corporate policies in accordance to the 
countries’ laws. With the inclusion of the interaction effects in Model 2, 
the Odd ratios for the direct relationships between variables reported 
in Model 1 show a minor change and confirms the significant effect of 
moderation in this study.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This paper have concluded that environmental performance is 
becoming a prime agenda for all governments across the globe. 
Governments have introduced several policies to cope with the 
challenges of climate change and environmental pollution. Hence, 
various sectors of the economy have been under pressure to 
implement environmental friendly policies. Several studies have been 
conducted to investigate the influence of decision-making bodies 
and organizations on the implementation of eco-friendly policies 
that could improve environmental performance. Previous literature 
have concluded that environmental performance is affected by the 
structure of corporate governance and institutional regulations. 
Corporate governance is defined as the decision-making body of an 
organization, and is responsible in determining strategic goals and 
agendas that could affect the organizational performance in various 
aspects including environmental performance. With the inclusion 
of governments and other institutions, the eco-friendly behavior of 
organizations does have a significant influence on environmental 
performance. Previous studies stated that the governance structure 
have influenced the social behavior of organizations. However, these 
studies are subjected to several theoretical and practical limitations. 
Due to the limitations from previous literature, this study empirically 
tested a model which included a pivotal variable (institutional 
regulations) that have often been ignored in past studies.
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The findings from this study have indicated a positive effect between 
environmental committee and the firms’ green performance. This 
suggests that delegating the responsibility of environmental issues to 
a specific board of committee will enhance the firms’ ability to produce 
more green products. An organization’s environmental committee 
should consist of directors with a specialization in ecology, whereby 
these directors are responsible to monitor and uphold the ISO 14001 
standards within the organization. Furthermore, the results have 
also shown a positive correlation between countries that have strict 
environmental regulations and the effectiveness of environmental 
committees to comply with the requirements of these regulations.
The role of independent directors in green performance was found 
to be positive in this study. Moreover, the moderating effect of 
institutional regulations is positive for the relationship between 
independent directors and firm performance. Hence, hypotheses 
1b and 3b were accepted. The significance of these relationships 
indicate that in order to create a good and sustainable image in an 
organization, independent directors would enforce more eco-friendly 
ideas to protect the organization’s image in public. Independent 
directors monitored the firms’ environmental standards with respect 
to institutional regulations without considering the cost, which 
subsequently led to an increase in the green performance of the 
companies. Additionally, the results concluded that the presence of 
foreign directors increased the green productivity of organizations. 
The binary regression output carried out in this study provided 
support for the acceptance of hypotheses 1c and 3c. Foreign directors 
were found to have diverse information on green management 
and policies from various countries which have acted as guidelines 
for organizations to implement. Due to the huge investments in 
organizations, foreign directors are more concerned with lawsuits 
and penalties that may result due to negligence or violation of these 
environmental regulations. Therefore, foreign directors would 
persuade corporate boards to impose more eco-friendly policies. 
Limitations and Future Research Suggestions
Although this paper has provided several important findings 
and have contributed to the existing literature, there are still some 
limitations that can be considered for future research. This study 
only included data from the manufacturing sector due to the limited 
data availability and the difficulty to manually record data from 
    35 
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annual reports. Therefore, future research can be conducted on other 
sectors of the economy. Moreover, other proxy variables of corporate 
governance such as female directors and ownership structure that 
includes foreign ownership can be further investigated in future 
research.
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